Heads of State who sent Nigerian military to fight in other African countries

 The ECOMOG has a history of successful interventions and it is safe to say that Nigerian soldiers are the backbone of its operations from the get-go.

It is no news that the Nigerian military is reputed as the most formidable troop among the forces of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

The ECOMOG, a military arm of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1990 for peacekeeping operations within West Africa.

The ECOMOG has a history of successful interventions and it is safe to say that Nigerian soldiers are the backbone of its operations from the get-go.

Due to the strength of its army, the Nigerian Government and its ECOMOG contingents often play a leading role in resolving conflicts and maintaining peace in West Africa.

For a country that provided about 80 % of ECOMOG troops and 90% of its funding in the ‘90s, its leaders would not be afraid to deploy them for military interventions in conflict zones.

It is on record that Nigeria provided 12,000 out of 16,000 ECOMOG troops in Liberia, and 12,000 out of 13,000 troops in Sierra Leone.

However, before Nigeria eased out of direct ECOMOG operations in 1999, the Nigerian troops had actively engaged in direct military intervention under the administrations of two military leaders.

Between 1989 and 1996, Nigerian soldiers during the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida led the ECOMOG troops comprising soldiers from Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.

In 1990, following the outbreak of civil war in Liberia, troops were deployed to the country to restore peace.

The crisis, occasioned by a power tussle between Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor resulted in one of the bloodiest wars in Africa.

The ECOMOG intervention in the Liberia war was justified on several grounds. Some of the reasons include the need to end the unfolding humanitarian disaster; the spread of the conflict to neighbouring states and the steady stream of Liberian refugees into other West African countries.

However, according to Cyril Obi, the Program Director for the African Peacebuilding Network (APN), the intervention of the Nigerian troops in the Liberian war has a personal dimension due to General Babangida’s friendship with the Liberian President, Samuel Doe.

Obi explained that Babangida’s reasons for intervening in the war were motivated by “Nigeria’s leadership aspirations in West Africa; Babangida’s image of himself as a great leader; his desire to leave an indelible mark on Nigeria’s history; the aspirations of the Nigerian army to enhance its status and to prove its worth as a national and sub-regional asset.”

Beyond this, another motivation for the ECOMOG’s intervention in the Liberia war was the concern among heads of state and the ruling elites in West Africa.

The leaders feared that, if rebellions against incumbent governments were allowed to succeed in one country, rebel groups in other countries might be encouraged to take up arms against authoritarian governments in their countries.

Barely a year after the end of the Liberian war, the ECOMOG troops were deployed to Sierra Leone in 1997, following a military coup that overthrew the civilian government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.

The coup led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma plunged the country into another civil war from 1997 to 2002.

In 1998, during the military administration of General Sani Abacha, the ECOMOG, under the command of Nigerian troops launched an attack against the rebel forces, decimated them and reinstated Kabbah as the President of Sierra Leone.

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Like Babangida, Nigeria, under General Abacha led the regional initiative for the restoration of normalcy in Sierra Leone to — among other reasons — limit the international isolation of his military regime.

After Nigeria's controversial military intervention in Sierra LeonePresident Olusegun Obasanjo wound down Nigerian soldiers' participation in ECOMOG in 1999.

The move by Obasanjo limited their involvement in ECOMOG's peacekeeping programmes to mediators in subsequent civil wars in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau.

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